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On November 3, 1992, voters in fourteen states turned the hourglass on
their congressional delegations. Ballot issues imposing term limits of twelve
years upon Senators and six or eight years upon House members were
approved by landslide majorities in most of these states.' And these victories
were only a single wave in an ongoing tide of reform. In 1990, voters in
Colorado had approved an amendment to their state constitution that limited
congressional terms.2 In November 1994, congressional term limits activists
expect to have their cause on referendum ballots in seven more states.3 If past
experience and opinion polls are any guide, the proposals should pass easily.
4
If so, they would add another 26 House members and 14 Senators to the 156
House members and 30 Senators already under the clock.
1. The results in the fourteen states were as follows (stated as percentage of votes in favor of term
limits): Arizona-74%; Arkansas--60%; California-63%; Florida-77%; Michigan-59%;
Missouri-74%; Montana-67%; Nebraska-68%; North Dakota-55%; Ohio-66%; Oregon-69%; South
Dakota--63%; Washington-52%; Wyoming-77%. Robert Reinhold, The 1992 Elections: The States-The
Ballot Issues, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at B8.
2. Term limits were endorsed by a 71% majority. Robert Pear, The 1990 Elections: Ballot Proposals,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 8, 1990, at B 1.
3. Alaska, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Utah. Term limits activists also
expect the issue to be on the Mississippi ballot in 1995. Interview with Paul Jacob, Executive Director of
U.S. Term Limits, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 1, 1993).
4. The only state in which the vote on a congressional term limits issue was even close in 1992 was
Washington, where a slim majority of 52% approved the imposition of limits. Reinhold, supra note 1, at
B8. A similar issue had failed on the popular ballot in Washington in 1991-the only time state referendum
voters have ever rejected term limits. The 1991 proposal failed largely because it contained no grandfather
clause; instead, it applied immediately and retroactively to sitting members of Congress, including Speaker
of the House Tom Foley. See Ladonna Lee, News Conference at National Press Club, Washington, D.C.
(Nov. 5, 1992), in U.S. Term Limits News Conference Concerning Term Limits, Fed. News Serv., Nov. 5,
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File. Survey data at the national level have consistently
indicated that substantial majorities favor term limits. A 1993 survey conducted by the Hart and Teeter
Research Companies found that 76% of the public favored limits on the number of terms served by
Senators and members of Congress. Pub. Opinion Online, Nov. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, Market
Library, Rpoll File. Another 1993 survey, conducted by Fabrizio, McLaughlin & Associates, indicated that
this support cuts across party lines: in favor of term limits were 75% of Democrats, 79% of Republicans,
and 76% of independents. Paul Jacob, From the Voters with Care 1 (Dec. 1, 1993) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author), presented in The Politics and Law of Term Limits (C-SPAN television
broadcast, Dec. 2, 1993).
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The ultimate objective of term limits proponents is an amendment to the
U.S. Constitution.5 Should this goal be achieved, the amendment will have
followed a legally anomalous path, one which was trodden twice during the
Progressive era-first by the campaign to bring about the popular election of
Senators with the Seventeenth Amendment, and then by the suffragists in their
struggle for the Nineteenth Amendment.6 These earlier amendments
conformed to the letter of Article V in meeting the formal requirements for
becoming part of the Constitution. However, in both cases the structure of the
amendment process was very different from that described in Article V and
contemplated by the Framers, because passage of the amendments depended
crucially on direct popular action in state-level referendums. The term limits
movement now seeks to follow the same route of constitutional transformation.
In the following analysis, I retrace the steps of the campaigns that brought
about the passage of the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments. I argue that
the path of constitutional change that these campaigns followed was
structurally different from that anticipated by the Framers in 1787, even though
it met the formal requirements of Article V. As a nation, we effectively
reconceived the amendment process during the Progressive era, implicitly
endorsing a new route of transformation under the rubric of Article V.
Although this alternative route of constitutional change diverges from the
intentions of the Framers, it is nonetheless a positive development because it
compensates for a manifest flaw in the design of Article V.
This Note begins by exploring the similarities between the current term
limits campaign and the two earlier movements. It then turns to the anomalous
nature of this particular method of constitutional transformation, explaining
how it differs from the Framers' conception of the amendment process.
Finally, it considers the consequent implications for constitutional theory: this
distinctive route of constitutional change has become a necessary supplement
5. See Paul Jacob, News Conference at National Press Club, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 5, 1992), in U.S.
Term Limits News Conference Concerning Term Limits, supra note 4.
6. Here, I intentionally borrow the terminology of Bruce Ackerman in his discussion of "legally
anomalous lawmaking forms." I believe that the mechanism of constituticnal transformation that led to the
Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments fits well under this label. Faced with seemingly insurmountable
congressional hostility and the bleak prospects of calling a constitutional convention under Article V,
amendment proponents initiated a "self-conscious breach with preexisting constitutional forms." See Bruce
A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1060-63 (1984).
7. The full text of Article V is as follows:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the
several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall
be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof,
as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that
no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight
shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article;
and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of it's equal Suffrage in the Senate.
U.S. CONST. art. V.
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to a mechanism of transformation that otherwise tends to preserve institutional
arrangements in which Congress has a direct stake.
I. THE DRIvE FOR CONGRESSIONAL TERM LIMITs
The campaign to establish congressional term limits has not been a
collection of disparate state movements content to impose limits merely upon
their own congressional delegations. Rather, it has been a unified national
effort to bring about an amendment to the federal Constitution. Three national
interest groups have coordinated the state-by-state campaign: U.S. Term
Limits, the Term Limits Legal Institute, and Americans Back in Charge.
These organizations have deliberately abandoned the predominant route of
constitutional transformation under Article V, whereby Congress initiates the
formal amendment process by proposing an amendment, which is in turn
ratified either by state legislatures or by state conventions. 9 Yet term limits
activists have not undertaken the hopeless quest for a national convention to
propose an amendment, the second route charted by Article V. 0 Instead, they
have pursued a path of incremental amendment that formally alters the
constitutional structure of the nation without waiting for Congress to propose
a constitutional amendment. It is only at the very end of this path, once the
national transformation is a virtual fait accompli, that the proposal and
ratification mechanisms of Article V come into play. The primary motivation
behind the adoption of this strategy has been the continued hostility of both
houses of Congress to the idea of term limits for their members. To date, more
than 150 bills to limit congressional terms have been introduced in
Congress-the vast majority since the mid-1970's-but only one has ever
reached a floor vote. The vote took place in the Senate in 1947, when the
proposal was defeated 82 to l. This hostility is not the expression of mere
8. See Cleta Mitchell, News Conference at National Press Club, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 5, 1992), in
U.S. Tenn Limits New Conference Concerning Term Limits, supra note 4.
9. See generally id. Technically, Article V stipulates four different routes by which the Constitution
may be amended. There are two proposal mechanisms: proposal by two-thirds of both houses of Congress
or proposal by a national convention called by two-thirds of the state legislatures. These combine with the
two ratification mechanisms to yield a total of four amendment paths. The state conventions ratification
mechanism has been used only once, with the Twenty-First Amendment's repeal of prohibition. For the
sake of simplicity, I merge these four paths into two general routes distinguished by the national body that
proposes the constitutional change: amendment via congressional proposition versus amendment via a
national constitutional convention.
10. On 399 occasions, state legislatures have called for a national proposing convention. Michael S.
Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V- The Constitutional Lessons of the 27th Amendment, 103 YALE Li.
677, 736 n.199 (1993). However, no campaign to call such a convention has ever succeeded. Two fruitless
campaigns in recent decades have garnered a significant number of state calls: 32 (of a necessary 34) state
applications for a balanced budget amendment and 19 for an amendment banning abortion. Francis J.
Flaherty, Constitutional Parley Is Two States Away, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 10, 1983, at 28. Several of these
applications were later withdrawn. Paulsen, supra, at 765, 768, 773. For further discussion of this as-yet
unsuccessful mechanism, see infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
II. See SULA RICHARDSON, CONGRESSIONAL TERMS OF OFFICE AND TENURE 45 (Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress No. 91-880 GOV, 1991); SULA P. RICHARDSON, TERM LIMITS FOR
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political opposition to term limits. Rather, it reflects Congress' inherent
structural interest in prolonging the tenure of its sitting members.
The strategy that term limits proponents are employing now is virtually
identical to that which led to the adoption of the Seventeenth and Nineteenth
Amendments. 12 In all three instances, an alternative amendment process was
necessary because the direct stake that members of Congress had in the
existing institutional arrangement made it impossible to persuade two-thirds of
both houses to propose the relevant amendment. There is, however, an
essential prerequisite for taking this path of constitutional change: a reform
similar in effect to the desired national amendment must be possible through
independent state action. The reform must be in an area where state and
national powers either overlap or are not precisely delineated by the
Constitution. This allows the states to pursue a process of incremental
amendment, whereby one state after another enacts the alteration in the
structure of the national government.
Assuming that this precondition of overlapping authority is met, the
campaign for the amendment is carried through four successive stages. First,
proponents circulate petitions to place the question on the ballot in states that
provide for statutory or constitutional initiatives. At present, voters have this
right in twenty-three states. 13 After referendum victories are achieved in these
states, the second stage begins, in which reformers lobby state legislatures to
make the change in non-initiative states. Typically, such reforms require an
amendment to the state constitution, and in forty-nine of the fifty states,
amendments to the state constitution must be approved via referendum. 4 The
third stage takes place when the weight of such state-level reforms leaves
members of Congress little option but to capitulate and endorse an amendment
to the U.S. Constitution. This compulsion may stem from the fact that
members of Congress elected in states that have made the change find that
self-interest and constituent pressure force them to act, or it may arise from a
desire to create equal conditions among the various states. 5 In this way, the
FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATORS 2 (Congressional Research Service Report for Congress No. 93-122
GOV, 1993). In 1991, the Senate indirectly considered the term limits issue when voting on an amendment
to a Senate finance reform bill that would have limited Senators who received public campaign financing
to two consecutive terms. The motion to table the amendment passed by a vote of 68 to 30. See SULA
RICHARDSON, CONGRESSIONAL TERMS OF OFFICE AND TENURE 45 (Congressional Research Service Report
for Congress No. 91-880 GOV, 1991).
12. See infra Parts I-In.
13. Most of these states adopted the initiative device between 1898 and 1912. KRIS W. KOBACH, THE
REFERENDUM: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN SWITZERLAND 236 (1993); see also Austin Ranney, The United
States of America, in REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY 67, 71-72
(David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1978).
14. The one exception is Delaware. KOBACH, supra note 13, at 251 n. 38.
15. This compulsion is considerably more powerful than that generated by a typical movement for
constitutional amendment. For example, when members of Congress first formally proposed the Equal
Rights Amendment in 1972, they were responding to the demands of a broad popular movement. However,
the individual member of Congress was not compelled to vote for the amendment to a greater degree than
he was compelled to vote for any popular piece of legislation. In contrast, when a state takes action of a
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process of incremental amendment at the state level produces a structural
inducement in Congress to pursue the reform. Finally, the fourth stage occurs,
with formal ratification by the states under the terms of Article V. This stage
has minimal practical significance in the many states that have already
deliberated and made the change during the first or second stage. For much of
the country, formal ratification becomes little more than a belated rubber stamp
for a transformation that has actually been embraced long beforehand.
The term limits movement is presently between the first and second stages.
Most of the initiative states have already been won, and the campaign is
proceeding to states where legislative action is required before the voters may
pass judgment. Term limits activists have also made preliminary moves in
anticipation of stage three by collecting pledges from members of Congress to
support a formal amendment to the U.S. Constitution.' 6 However, their path
is not without obstacles. Complaints challenging the constitutionality of state-
imposed congressional term limits were filed in federal courts in Washington,
Florida, and Arkansas shortly after the 1992 referendums.' 7 In February 1994,
the district court in Washington state ruled on the merits of the claim and held
unconstitutional the state's congressional term limitation measure.'" The issue
is virtually certain to end up before the Supreme Court, and a lively
constitutional debate is already underway.' 9
constitutional nature and ratifies the reform via referendum, two powerful factors are added to the political
calculation of a Senator or Representative from that state. First, the opinion of his constituents on the matter
becomes not only clear, but compelling. Unlike opinion polls which may be inaccurate or may reflect
lightly held opinions, referendum results are unmistakable and usually represent a more solemn commitment
of the voter. Ignoring them is politically dangerous. Second, members of Congress elected under a
particular framework (say, one in which both women and men vote) will develop a personal stake in
preserving and entrenching that framework.
16. U.S. Term Limits News Conference Concerning Term Limits, supra note 4.
17. See Susan B. Glasser, Lawsuits in Three States Now Challenging Constitutionality of Hill Tern
Limitations, ROLL CALL, Dec. 21, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rollcl File; Elizabeth Willson,
Term Limits Quickly Land in Court, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1992, at lB.
18. Thorsted v. Gregoire, No. C92-1763VD (W.D. Wash. Feb. 10, 1994). The court declared
Washington Initiative Measure 573 unconstitutional and enjoined state officials from enforcing its
provisions. Id., slip op. at 36. The court relied primarily on the argument that the Qualifications Clauses
in Article I, Sections 2 and 3, of the Constitution should be construed as exclusive and that state-imposed
term limits impermissibly add another qualification for serving in Congress. Id., slip op. at 13-23, 26-27.
It also accepted the plaintiffs' claim that term limits burden voters' and candidates' First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of free association. Id., slip op. at 24-26. The court rejected the defendants' contention
that term limits should be regarded as a state-imposed time, place, or manner regulation of elections,
permitted by Article I, Section 4. Id., slip op. at 22-29. It also rejected the argument that the power to
impose term limits is reserved to the states by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. Id., slip op. at 29-31.
19. The substantive arguments for and against state-imposed congressional term limits already have
been deployed extensively elsewhere; such claims are beyond the scope of this analysis. For articles arguing
that state-imposed term limits are constitutional, see, e.g., Neil Gorsuch & Michael Guzman, Will the
Gentlemen Please Yield? A Defense of the Constitutionality of State-Imposed Term Limitations, 20 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 341 (1991); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., A Defense of State Constitutional Limits on Federal
Congressional Terms, 53 U. PrIT. L. REV. 97 (1991); Robert C. DeCarli, Note, The Constitutionality of
State-Enacted Term Limits Under the Qualifications Clauses, 71 TEX. L. REV. 865 (1993). For articles
arguing that state-imposed term limits are unconstitutional see, e.g., Martin E. Latz, The Constitutionality
of State-Passed Congressional Term Limits, 25 AKRON L. REv. 155 (1991); Brendan Barnicle, Comment,
Congressional Term Limits: Unconstitutional by Initiative, 67 WASH. L. REV. 415 (1992); Joshua Levy,
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This Note addresses neither the merits of state-imposed congressional term
limits, nor their constitutionality per se. Rather, it focuses on the process of
amendment that is being used and its historical antecedents. However, the
outcome of the constitutional challenge to state-imposed congressional term
limits will have a direct bearing on whether the term limits movement can
pursue this alternative path of transformation to a successful conclusion. If the
Supreme Court rules that the Constitution prohibits states from imposing term
limits upon their representatives in Congress, then the prerequisite for taking
this path of transformation-the overlap of state and national authority-would
no longer be satisfied, and the process would be derailed. Proponents of term
limits would be forced either to give up their struggle or to attempt one of the
traditional routes of constitutional transformation. The final section of this Note
offers a process-based argument against such judicial invalidation of state-
imposed congressional term limits-regardless of the substantive validity of
term limits. Judicial action barring state-imposed congressional term limits
would block a vital, alternative path of constitutional change.2" This
alternative path remedies a significant defect in the Framers' design of the
amendment process: the ability of Congress to obstruct institutional reforms
that threaten the inherent interests of its sitting members. This is precisely the
barrier that confronted proponents of woman suffrage and the popular election
of Senators in the late nineteenth century.
II. POPULAR ELECTION OF SENATORS AND THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT
The drive to bring about the popular election of Senators faced seemingly
insurmountable congressional hostility from the outset. Although the House of
Representatives responded favorably to early calls for a constitutional
amendment, the Senate was firmly opposed to the idea of replacing selection
by state legislatures with popular election. Senators who had successfully
attained national office through masterful maneuvering among state political
hacks were disinclined to see if they could do as well stumping before the
voters. For most of the nineteenth century, resolutions calling for the proposal
of a constitutional amendment died quietly in committee."' It appeared that
the Senate establishment had little to fear from proponents of popular election.
Note, Can They Throw the Bums Out? The Constitutionality of State-Imposed Congressional Term Limits,
80 GEO. L.J. 1913 (1992).
20. See infra Part VI.B.
21. During the first 80 years of the republic, only nine resolutions were introduced in Congress to
amend the Constitution to provide for the popular election of Senators, the first in 1826. All nine died in
committee. In the 1870's and 1880's, the number of resolutions increased. Most were submitted in the
House, which was considerably more receptive to the reform than the Senate. However, none of these
resolutions was allowed to reach the House floor until 1892. 1 GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE
UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND PRACTICE 96-97 (1938).
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However, in the closing decades of the century, public support for popular
election began to grow. Numerous cases of senatorial corruption involving
bribery greatly impaired the reputation of the chamber.22 Deadlocks in state
legislatures attempting to select their Senators further fueled public discontent.
From 1891 to 1905 there were forty-five deadlocks in twenty different
states.' Often, this political trench warfare in the state legislatures could be
resolved only through the selection of a compromise candidate who was less
fit for office than either of the party favorites. Some of the more acrimonious
debates even led to violence. 24
The publicity accorded such episodes further intensified demands for
popular elections. The Populist Party made the popular election of Senators
one of its flagship issues. In the Midwest, agrarian interests became convinced
that only popular election could weaken the power that railroads and other
corporate interests had over the Senate and end the economic discrimination
against the region.' Finally, in 1892, the House leadership allowed a
resolution proposing a constitutional amendment to reach the House floor. It
passed by a two-thirds majority in early 1893, only to be buried in committee
in the Senate.26 As sympathetic as the House of Representatives was to a
constitutional amendment, Senate hostility showed no signs of abating. Four
more times between 1894 and 1902 the House voted overwhelmingly in favor
of the popular election of Senators, and in each instance the Senate refused
even to allow the proposed amendment to come to a vote.27 As is currently
the case with term limits, there was no way that two-thirds of both houses of
Congress would take the lead in proposing the amendment.
But the states could. Starting in 1901, various states passed resolutions
calling for a national convention to propose an amendment in accordance with
the second proposing mechanism of Article V. However, like every effort
before and since, the campaign for a national proposing convention was
unsuccessful. Meanwhile, more promising steps toward the popular election of
Senators had been taken within state parties. Between 1890 and 1900, parties
in numerous states began holding direct primaries, in which voters could
indicate the candidate they supported for U.S. Senator. State legislators from
the party then bound themselves to support the winner of the popular primary
vote when it came time to select a Senator. However, this system could only
make the popular vote truly decisive in states where one party held an
22. Id. at 91.
23. id. at 86-88.
24. In Kentucky in 1896, the Governor was compelled to summon the militia, and the troops
maintained order in the legislative chamber for three days. In Missouri in 1905, the legislative session
involving senatorial selection dissolved into a fistfight on the chamber floor. Id. at 90-91.
25. See Larry J. Easterling, Sen. Joseph L Bristow and the Seventeenth Amendment, 41 KAN. HisT.
Q. 488, 492-93 (1975).
26. HAYNES, supra note 21, at 97 n.l.
27. See id. at 97 & n..
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overwhelming majority in the state legislature. Thus, it was in the
Democrat-controlled South that the direct party-primary system first served to
bring about the effective popular election of Senators.28
A more decisive innovation came during the following decade. In 1904,
citizens in Oregon petitioned for and approved a popular initiative instituting
a system that would soon be copied throughout the country. The law, endorsed
by a three-to-one majority in the Oregon referendum, provided that candidates
for the U.S. Senate had to be nominated by voter petitions. In the election
preceding the state legislature's selection of a Senator for Congress, citizens
would be allowed to vote for their choice for Senator. However, the U.S.
Constitution required state legislatures to choose the Senators.2 9 Thus, a
method was needed to bind state lawmakers to select the choice of the people.
Accordingly, the Oregon system provided that candidates for the state
legislature could sign one of two public statements. By signing "Statement
No. 1," the aspiring state legislator promised to vote "for that candidate for
United States Senator in Congress who has received the highest number of the
people's votes .... without regard to my individual preference."3 In
contrast, "Statement No. 2" indicated that the legislator would "consider the
vote of the people for United States Senator ... as nothing more than a
recommendation, which I shall be at liberty to wholly disregard if the reason
for so doing seems to me to be sufficient."'', Not surprisingly, few politicians
were willing to risk signing Statement No. 2, particularly when citizens were
circulating petitions on which they promised not to vote for any candidate who
failed to sign Statement No. 1. It so happened that the first Oregon legislature
elected after the enactment of this law had to select two Senators. It took only
twenty minutes for the legislature to select the two winners of the popular
vote,32 demonstrating to the nation that the popular election of Senators could
be achieved before the federal Constitution was formally amended.
A clear message was also sent to proponents of a federal constitutional
amendment: the transformation could be made state by state until the weight
of such changes induced Congress to act. State after state copied what became
known as the "Oregon system." Between 1905 and 1908, it was adopted in
fifteen states.33 By the end of 1908, twenty-eight states had some mechanism
28. See id. at 99-100.
29. "The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by
the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.
1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § I.
30. HAYNE, supra note 21, at 101.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 102.
33. Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin all adopted mandatory, statewide, direct
systems. Mississippi and Wisconsin amended mechanisms that had been enacted prior to Oregon's. For a
full list of state actions taken to bring about the popular election of Senators, see 45 CONG. REc. 7109-20
(1910) (statement of Sen. Owen).
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in place by which Senators were effectively popularly elected.' This
transformation proved to be the most influential in finally winning a formal
amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Senators who had in fact been elected by
the people of their states were loath to flaunt the will of their constituencies.
In 1911, as the Senate debate on the issue reached a turning point, the most
persistent advocates of a federal constitutional amendment were Senators who
had been popularly elected.3' As Idaho's Senator William E. Borah, one of
the most prominent supporters of popular election, proclaimed: "I should not
have been here if it had not been practiced ... and I have great affection for
the bridge which carried me over.,
36
Thus, the first and second stages of this path of constitutional
transformation were completed. Through incremental state action, the structure
of the Senate had been transformed. Consequently, enough senatorial support
existed to etch into the formal constitutional text what was already a reality in
nearly two-thirds of the forty-six states. All that remained were the final two
stages-congressional proposition and state ratification-which would convert
this incremental amendment into a normal constitutional amendment and
impose it uniformly across the country. The Senate's endorsement of the
change, which had seemed all but impossible at the turn of the century, was
within reach by the end of 1908. This dramatic reversal was the result of the
state-by-state alterations of the structure of the federal government.
Finally, on June 12, 1911, two-thirds of the Senate approved an
amendment to the U.S. Constitution providing for the popular election of its
own members.37 On May 13, 1912, after an eleven-month stalemate in the
House-Senate conference committee, the House accepted the Senate version of
the amendment, and it went to the states for formal ratification.
34. Senator Owen listed 37 states that had adopted measures allowing popular input in the selection
of U.S. Senators. Of these, 28 provided for direct nomination by the people. Id.
35. HAYNES, supra note 21, at 107-08.
36. 46 CONG. REc. 3,2647 (1911) (statement of Sen. Borah). William Van Alstyne has suggested an
alternative theory as to why the Senate ultimately capitulated and endorsed the Seventeenth Amendment.
Noting that numerous states had called for a national proposing convention to address the issue, he argues
that the possibility of the necessary two-thirds of the states eventually making such a call pushed the Senate
into action. William Van Alstyne, Notes on a Bicentennial Constitution: Part I, Processes of Change, 1984
U. ILL. L. REv. 933, 943 (1984). However, he offers no historical evidence that the fear of a convention
motivated the Senate. Indeed, several times during the 1900-1905 period, there had been a flurry of state
calls for a convention, often by states that had already made such a call. Yet none of these spurts produced
a Senate response. Although these calls may have had some weight in the Senate's eventual acquiescence,
they could never be as decisive as the electoral interests of the Senators from the 28 states that had already
effectively adopted popular election. These Senators had a vested interest in supporting the reform endorsed
by the voters of their states and entrenching it on a national level. Thus, the adoption of the Oregon system
brought pressure to bear in a much more direct way than that suggested by Van Alstyne.
37. Passage in the Senate was delayed by a prolonged dispute on the peripheral issue of whether the
amendment should include a provision to bar federal regulation of congressional elections, a question with
weighty implications for the racially biased electoral practices common in Southern states. For an account
of this dispute, see Easterling, supra note 25, at 505-09.
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The extent to which formal state ratification had become a virtual rubber
stamp was evident in the unusual rapidity with which the states voted to ratify
the amendment. There was little deliberation; the decisive state-level debates
had occurred years earlier. Less than eleven months after the amendment's
formal submission by Congress, Connecticut became the thirty-sixth state to
ratify, and the Seventeenth Amendment became part of the U.S.
Constitution.38
III. WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT
Just as the curtain was closing on the struggle for the Seventeenth
Amendment, the suffragist movement was starting to gain momentum on the
same path of transformation. Like the former, the latter campaign began many
decades before the constitutional amendment was achieved. It originated at a
meeting on July 19-20, 1848, in Seneca Falls, New York. The participants
drafted a "Declaration of Sentiments" protesting the political, social, and
economic inferiority of women. The Declaration also included the first public
demand for extending the franchise to women. It was the first of many such
conventions in the nascent women's rights movement, and virtually all of the
activists in the cause were abolitionists as well.39 The Civil War and the
subsequent amendments to the Constitution brought an extended hiatus to the
woman suffrage movement, as national attention was focused on the abolition
of slavery and the extension of political rights to African-Americans.
Suffragists were unable to tie their cause to the racial issue and failed in an
attempt to prevent the enfranchisement of African-Americans without the
granting of the same rights to women. However, the passage of the Civil War
Amendments did further the suffragist cause in one sense: it defined an
objective for the movement that had previously seemed unattainable-an
amendment to the U.S. Constitution."
Accordingly, in January 1878, suffragists persuaded Senator A.A. Sargent
of California to introduce a suffrage amendment in Congress. However, the
movement was soon presented with seemingly insuperable barriers preventing
congressional proposition. As with the popular election of Senators, an inherent
structural interest in Congress made the proposal of a constitutional amendment
virtually impossible under the existing institutional framework-sitting
Congressmen were unwilling to risk their seats by trying their luck with an
electorate that included women. The amendment was buried in committee for
nine years, and when the full Senate finally considered it in 1887, it was
38. See id. at 509. Connecticut ratified on April 8, 1913. The ratification of 36 states was required
after Arizona and New Mexico entered the Union in 1912. Id.
39. See AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1890-1920, at 1-2
(W.W. Norton & Co. 1981) (1965).
40. CARRIE C. CA'IT & NEIE R. SHULER, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND POLITICS 228 (1926).
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defeated by a vote of sixteen to thirty-four. It would not come to a vote again
in the Senate until 1914 and was not voted on at all in the House during this
period."a Faced with unyielding congressional inaction, suffragists turned to
the states and embarked on the same path of incremental amendment used by
proponents of the popular election of Senators. All along, their primary
objective would remain a federal constitutional amendment. 42
Shortly after the proposed amendment disappeared into the congressional
morass in 1878, the leaders of the woman suffrage movement formulated their
state-by-state strategy, commencing a series of state-level campaigns to win the
ballot for women.43 In virtually every state, the extension of the franchise to
women would require the passage of a constitutional amendment, which
depended upon winning a majority of the male electorate in a referendum.
Over the next fifty-two years, the suffragists would wage fifty-six referendum
campaigns' in twenty-nine different states and territories4 ' Initially, the
effort to win the states proceeded slowly and yielded few successes. The first
referendum on the subject had already been held in Kansas in 1867, where the
suffragists lost. However, this defeat had been balanced in 1869 and 1870 by
minor victories in the territories of Wyoming and Utah. In each, the territorial
legislature had voted to enfranchise women. Referendums were not required.46
The campaign to bring woman suffrage into existence state by state
accelerated in the 1880's and 1890's. Between 1882 and 1898, the question
was placed on eleven state referendum ballots in nine different states.47
However, it passed in only two--Colorado in 1893, and Idaho in 1896.
Opponents of the suffrage movement found it easy to exploit the fact that
many suffragists were also active in the prohibition movement, a connection
which aroused the antagonism of the "wets."48
41. Id. at 229-34. The most adamant opposition came from Southern Democrats. Id. at 229-33.
42. Id. at 230-31.
43. At this point, there were two national organizations behind the movement, the National Woman
Suffrage Association and the American Woman Suffrage Association. They united in 1890 to become the
National American Woman Suffrage Association. KRADITOR, supra note 39, at 3-4. Interestingly, although
the suffragists did not realize their ultimate goal until seven years after adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment, they actually settled upon the same strategy of constitutional transformation well before
advocates of popular senatorial election did so.
44. See CATr & SHULER, supra note 40, at 107; KRADITOR, supra note 39, at 5.
45. See CATr & SHULER, supra note 40, at 110-342.
46. In Wyoming, the presence of a few politicians who argued fervently for woman suffrage had a
major impact in the small territorial legislature, as did the expectation that such a step would dramatically
advertise the territories to the rest of the nation. Id. at 75-78. In Utah, the bill was urged by opponents of
polygamy, who assumed incorrectly that the enfranchisement of women would lead to its elimination.
Seventeen years later, in 1887, opponents of polygamy in Congress voted to disenfranchise women in Utah,
thinking that the blow would persuade advocates of polygamy to capitulate. Nevertheless, the territory later
included woman suffrage in its proposed state constitution; when Utah was finally granted statehood in
1896, women were again allowed to vote. See i. at 127-28.
47. California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota (twice), and
Washington (twice). Id. at 108-20.
48. Id. at 133-59.
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At the turn of the century, the state-by-state fight of the suffragists reached
its nadir. During the eleven-year period of 1899-1909, proponents of woman
suffrage were able to persuade the legislatures of only two states to place the
issue on the ballot-once in New Hampshire (1902) and three times in Oregon
(1900, 1906, 1908).49 In none of these referendums was suffrage approved.
The overall strategy, however, was not abandoned. In 1908, Theodore
Roosevelt counseled the movement to "Go, get another state."50 The aging
Susan B. Anthony was of the same view:
I don't know the exact number of States we shall have to have, .
but I do know that there will come a day when that number will
automatically and resistlessly act on the Congress of the United States
to compel the submission of a federal suffrage amendment. And we
shall recognize that day when it comes. 5'
The tide was soon to turn in the suffragists' favor. In 1910, they pulled off a
surprise victory in a state referendum in Washington.52 And in 1911, a
California legislature under the sway of progressives in both major parties
agreed to submit a state woman suffrage amendment to the voters. It passed
by a narrow margin of only 3587 votes 3
These two victories had a momentous impact on the rest of the nation. In
November 1912, suffrage amendments went before voters in six states,
winning in three.54 Soon, additional states fell into line. In total, during the
period from 1910 to 1918, twenty-four states held a total of thirty-one
referendums on the question. Of these, eleven states voted for woman suffrage.
By the end of 1918, the movement had achieved referendum victories in
thirteen states. In addition, the two territories to adopt suffrage had been
admitted to the Union, making a total of fifteen states in which women could
vote in elections at every level of government. Suffragists anticipated that their
moment had come. Already in the 1916 election, women in eleven states had
49. Id. at 124-26.
50. Id. at 227.
51. As paraphrased by Carrie Chapman Catt and Nettie Rogers Shuler. Id. at 227.
52. Id. at 174.
53. Yes-125,037; No-121,450. Id. at 176.
54. Woman suffrage won in Arizona, Kansas, and Oregon and lost in Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin.
In Arizona and Oregon, the issue came before the electorate as a popular initiative. In Ohio, it was
submitted to the electorate by a constitutional convention held in 1912. In the other three states, the issue
was placed on the ballot by the legislatures. Id. at 176-88, 196-201.
55. The record of state referendums on woman suffrage is as follows. "Y" indicates that voters adopted
woman suffrage; "N" indicates that it was rejected. Arizona 1912-Y California 1896-N, 1911-Y Colorado
1877-N, 1893-Y; Idaho 1896-Y; Iowa 1916-N; Kansas 1867-N, 1894-N, 1912-Y; Louisiana 1918-N; Maine
1917-N; Massachusetts 1915-N; Michigan 1874-N, 1912-N, 1918-Y; Missouri 1914-N; Montana 1914-Y;
Nebraska 1882-N, 1914-N; Nevada 1914-Y; New Hampshire 1902-N; New Jersey 1915-N; New York
1915-N, 1917-Y; North Dakota 1914-N; Ohio 1912-N, 1914-N; Oklahoma 1910-N, 1918-Y; Oregon
1884-N, 1900-N, 1906-N, 1908-N, 1910-N, 1912-Y Pennsylvania 1915-N; Rhode Island 1887-N; South
Dakota 1890-N, 1898-N, 1914-N, 1916-N, 1918-Y Texas 1919-N; Washington 1889-N, 1898-N, 1910-Y
Wisconsin 1912-N; West Virginia 1916-N. Id. at 54-58, 107-226, 292-315.
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voted for presidential electors, allowing them to claim that Woodrow Wilson
could not have won reelection without the women's vote. To these eleven were
added states in which legislative action alone could empower women to vote
for presidential electors (though not for members of Congress).56 By the time
of the next presidential election, women would be voting for president in thirty
states.s7 Congress was beginning to feel the pressure too in 1918, as the
growing number of Senators and Representatives elected by women asserted
the interests of their new constituents.
On January 10, 1918, the House of Representatives proposed a federal
constitutional amendment with the required two-thirds majority. However, the
resistance of Southern Democrats in the Senate delayed a vote in the second
chamber until October 1, when the amendment failed by two votes. After
falling short again on February 10, 1919, the suffrage amendment was finally
approved by the Senate on June 4, 1919. As with the Seventeenth Amendment,
the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment proceeded astonishingly quickly.
The real debates were already over; most of the states had deliberated
extensively on the issue long before Congress had even come close to formally
proposing the amendment. Within one month, eleven states had ratified the
amendment. Within six months, twenty-two states had done so.58 On August
24, 1920, Tennessee became the thirty-sixth and final state to ratify. The
Nineteenth Amendment became part of the U.S. Constitution.59
In winning ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, the suffragists
successfully completed the same route of constitutional transformation that had
been travelled by advocates of the popular election of Senators a few years
earlier. Both amendments posed an inherent and direct threat to the reelection
of sitting members of Congress; accordingly, there was little chance that
Congress would exercise its proposing function unless compelled to do so.
Consequently, proponents of reform used the states to usurp this function.
Effectively, individual states were proposing and ratifying an incremental
transformation in the structure of Congress. The circumstances surrounding the
current campaign for congressional term limits are virtually the same.
56. Illinois was the first to do so, in 1913, after which other states followed. Id. at 189-95.
57. JOHN S. BASSETt, EXPANSION AND REFORM: 1889-1926, at 322 (1926).
58. Id. at 350, 371.
59. Nine Southern states remained adamantly opposed to the amendment to the very end, and woman
suffrage stood no realistic chance of approval in these states. Thus, the fact that ratification occurred in 36
states, out of a total available pool of 39 non-Southern states, in only 14 months is particularly noteworthy.
This entrenched resistance to woman suffrage in the South meant that incremental, state-by-state
amendment probably would not have extended the franchise in Southern states for years. In this respect,
the completion of stages three and four, resulting in a formal amendment to the U.S. Constitution, had an
important effect: it compelled the Southern states to make reforms which brought them into step with the
rest of the country-reforms that they otherwise would not have adopted for years.
1994] 1983
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 103: 1971
IV. DEFYING THE FRAMERS: AMENDMENT THROUGH DIRECT VOTER
ACTION AT THE STATE LEVEL
This Note has described three different movements to bring about a
constitutional amendment, each of which followed, or is presently following,
a strikingly similar path. It is now necessary to consider the relationship
between this path and that charted by the Framers in Article V. The
constitutional positivist will have little difficulty rendering such an assessment,
at least as far as the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments are
concerned. 60 Viewed through positivist lenses, these two transformations are
like any of the other amendments to the Constitution. In both cases, Congress
and the states jumped through all of the hoops stipulated by Article V, and so
we recognize the amendments as part of the Constitution. The events that took
place beforehand might be interesting, but they are ultimately inconsequential
for the legality of the amendment process.
Viewed through structuralist lenses, however, the three amendments are
less easily reconciled with the route of constitutional change envisioned by the
Framers and described in Article V.6' The Framers stipulated two specific
mechanisms for amending the Constitution, the structural characteristics of
which were delineated in the text of Article V,62 as well as in their recorded
statements. Both mechanisms share two fundamental structural
characteristics--characteristics that do not describe the alternative route of
amendment discussed above. These are: (1) representative bodies, rather than
the citizens themselves, deliberate and act on proposed amendments; and (2)
amendments are proposed at the national level, either by Congress or by a
60. Given the considerable confusion surrounding the meaning of legal positivism, it may be necessary
to define what I mean by a "positivist" approach to constitutional interpretation. Legal positivism, a variant
of ethical positivism, insists upon a distinction between what the law is and what the law ought to be. It
supposes that there are a finite set of criteria for determining what (positive) law is, setting law apart from
mere moral standards. More often than not, such identifying criteria are framed in procedural terms; for
example, a statute may be defined as a norm that is passed by the legislature and approved by the executive
according to certain procedures. Positivist constitutional jurisprudence seeks to formulate unambiguous rules
of recognition for identifying constitutional law. Accordingly, the positivist approach to Article V seeks
clear procedural criteria which must be satisfied for a norm to be recognized as constitutional law, and it
emphasizes those criteria that can be extracted unambiguously from the text. For a more complete
explanation of positivism in its various guises, see Owen M. Fiss, The Varieties of Positivism, 90 YALE
L.J. 1007 (1981).
61. Perhaps even more than the term "positivist," the term "structuralist" conjures up a host of
meanings and implications, many of which are wholly unrelated to the present endeavor. This Note uses
the term "structuralist" to refer to the school of thought that holds that, in order to divine the full meaning
of any text, the interpreter must comprehend the underlying structure, which can only be described partially
by any particular set of words. This approach also stresses that the individual elements of any legal
structure can only be defined in relation to all of the other elements in the structure; every rule is a product
of the surrounding rules. Accordingly, the specific text of a law must comport with the larger framework
in which the law functions. Thus, a structuralist approach to Article V might regard the specific rules
described in the text as only a partial description of a larger amending structure. A similar use of the term
is employed in Kenneth W. Starr, Of Forests and Trees: Structuralism in the Interpretation of Statutes, 56
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 703 (1988).
62. See supra note 9.
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national convention, and they are then ratified at the state level, again either
by existing legislatures or by conventions. The following analysis explores
these structural aspects of Article V in greater detail and demonstrates that the
path of amendment followed with the Seventeenth Amendment, the Nineteenth
Amendment, and now term limits diverges considerably from the expectations
of the Framers. Acceptance of this view does not render the Seventeenth and
Nineteenth Amendments unconstitutional, for clearly both met the formal
requirements of Article V. Despite this formal compliance, however, the
amendment process was significantly rerouted during the Progressive era.
There is now a third path of amendment, one which was not envisioned by the
Framers and probably would not have been acceptable to them in 1787.
A. Action by Representative Assemblies
The first, and perhaps the most important, structural characteristic of the
amendment process laid out in Article V is that it embraces deliberative action
by representative bodies, rather than direct action by citizens. The text refers
only to action through representative assemblies, be they ongoing (Congress
and the state legislatures) or temporary (a national proposing convention and
state ratifying conventions). The omission of avenues of direct popular action
was deliberate; the intent of the Framers is clear on this issue.
Considerable evidence indicates that the Framers strongly rejected any
direct participation of citizens in the amendment process. During the debates
of the 1787 Constitutional Convention, direct popular consideration of
constitutional amendments was never even discussed as an option.63 Instead,
careful deliberation by legislative assemblies was extolled. 64 The closest that
"the People" would come to participating in the amendment process would be
through ratification by state conventions, which were seen by the Framers as
organs expressing the views "of the people themselves. 65 This understanding
that a convention was "in a special manner the epitome of the People" had
emerged in the colonies during the 1775-1776 period and was well established
by the time of the 1787 Convention.66 Indeed, during the 1787 debates,
Madison explicitly equated state ratifying conventions with "the supreme
63. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter
CONVENTION RECORDS]; Jonathan L. Walcoff, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Voter Initiative Applications
for Federal Constitutional Conventions, 85 CoLuM. L. REV. 1525, 1528-30, 1537 (1985).
64. See Walcoff, supra note 63, at 1529.
65. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 192 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982); see also
Constitutional Convention Procedures: Hearings on S. 3, S. 520, and S. 1710 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Senate Comn. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 194 (1979) (statement of Charles
L. Black).
66. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 337 (1969)
(quoting the Pennsylvania Packet (Philadelphia), Sept. 17, 1776). For a thorough description of how the
convention device emerged and gained acceptance by 1787, see id. at 306-43.
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authority of the people., 67 "The people" were thought to speak in such
conventions, but only through their elected delegates. Popular involvement
through direct voting on amendments was out of the question.
This elitist aversion to direct popular consideration of political questions
pervades the records and writings of the Framers. James Madison, writing in
defense of the Constitution in The Federalist, was particularly explicit about
the Framers' disdain for direct participation by the people in the processes of
government. It was thought that such a "pure Democracy" could "admit of no
cure for the mischiefs of faction." Representative government was much
preferred: "A Republic, by which I mean a Government in which the scheme
of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure
for which we are seeking." 68 Madison expressly rejected the idea of referring
constitutional questions to popular votes, particularly those questions which
involved disputes between branches of government. In The Federalist, he
raised the possibility of doing so, either on a frequent or infrequent basis, and
concluded that there were "insuperable objections against the proposed
recurrence to the people. ' 69 He feared that it would foster social instability:
"The danger of disturbing the public tranquility by interesting too strongly the
public passions, is a still more serious objection against a frequent reference
of constitutional questions, to the decision of the whole society."'7
Furthermore, decisions by the people would inevitably be misguided. Parties
and demagogues would excite the enthusiasm of a credulous public. Their
decision "could never be expected to turn on the true merits of the question.
... The passions.., not the reason, of the public, would sit in judgment."7
Such sentiments were widely shared at the 1787 Convention. The delegates
betrayed their distrust of popular judgment in a variety of contexts. For
example, Elbridge Gerry offered the following words of caution:
[T]he evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy. The
people do not want virtue; but are the dupes of pretended patriots. In
[Massachusetts] it has been fully confirmed by experience that they
are daily misled into the most baneful measures and opinions by the
false reports circulated by designing men ......
67. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 70 (W.W. Norton
& Co. 1987) (1840).
68. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 46 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
69. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 255 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982). In making this point,
Madison felt the need to account for the fact that the state constitutions of Massachusetts and New
Hampshire had been put to a popular vote. He explained that these were unique cases, coming at a time
when the British military threat inspired an unusual rationality in popular decisionmaking. See infra notes
103-05 and accompanying text.
70. Id. at 256.
71. Id. at 258.
72. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 63, at 48 (speaking against popular election of Congress).
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Edmund Randolph voiced a similar concern that the "evils" which stem "from
the turbulence and follies of democracy" be checked.73 Alexander Hamilton,
whose distrust of the masses was well-known, noted candidly in a 1777 letter
to Gouverneur Morris that direct, popular decisionmaking would result in
"error, confusion and instability."74 He remained just as skeptical of the
people's acumen in 1788. He wrote that, "the people commonly intend the
PUBLIC GOOD," but they do not "always reason right about the means of
promoting it."75
By 1787, the levelling impetus of 1776 had long since given way to
profound elite suspicion of popular action. Crusades for paper money, the
tender laws, the confiscation of property, and the suspension of ordinary means
for the collection of debts had occurred in the intervening years. Such schemes
were deemed by the Federalists an "'open and outrageous ... violation of
every principle of justice."', 76 They regarded government as "'a complicated
science,"' which "'requires abilities and knowledge, of a variety of other
subjects, to understand it.' ' 77 Gordon Wood summarizes the Federalists' deep
mistrust of popular decisionmaking as follows: "To the Federalists the greatest
dangers to republicanism were flowing not, as the old Whigs had thought,
from the rulers or from any distinctive minority in the community, but from
the widespread participation of the people in the government. 78 As James
MacGregor Burns describes it, Madison's objective at the Convention of 1787
was to create "barricade after barricade against the thrust of a popular
majority."79 He believed that the "diseases" of popular government could only
be remedied in a properly constructed, large republic." The definitive element
of such a republic was representation. Madison stated that the "true
distinction" of American government "lies in the total exclusion of the people
in their collective capacity from any share" in the government. 8' Thomas
Paine agreed: the American polity was based "wholly on the system of
73. Id. at 51 (arguing that a smaller Senate would be better insulated against such dangers).
74. WOOD, supra note 66, at 225 (quoting letter from Alexander Hamilton to Gouverneur Morris (May
19, 1777) (asserting the superiority of representative democracy over direct democracy)).
75. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 363 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982). He also expressed
wonder as to why the people did not err more often, beset as they were "by the wiles of parasites and
sycophants, by the snares of the ambitious, the avaricious, the desperate; by the artifices of men, who
possess their confidence more than they deserve it, and of those who seek to possess, rather than to deserve
it." Id.
76. WOOD, supra note 66, at 404 (quoting ST. GAZETTE OF S.C., Mar. 5, 1787).
77. Id. at 508 (quoting CONN. COURANT, Nov. 20, 1786).
78. Id. at 517.
79. JAMES M. BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY: FOUR-PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 20
(1963).
80. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 42, 46-49 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 322 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
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representation." 2 Accordingly, no direct popular role was included in the
amendment process.
Further evidence of the Framers' intention to exclude the people from
direct involvement in the amendment process is supplied by comparison with
contemporary state models. In fashioning the U.S. Constitution, the Framers
often lifted phrases and sections from the state constitutions that existed at the
time. Although Article V copied none of the state models exactly, it came
closest in form to the constitutions of Georgia and Massachusetts, in which
localities were empowered to apply for constitutional conventions. 84 However,
the Framers made one important omission in following the Georgia and
Massachusetts examples: they did not include a provision for direct popular
involvement in the calling of conventions.85 This omission reflects the
conscious rejection of direct democracy in the amendment process.
Akhil Amar has argued for an opposing point of view on this issue.
Maintaining that the overall structure and context of the Constitution allows
for direct democracy in the amendment process, Amar contends that it is
possible to read between the lines of the Constitution and find an
unenumerated right of the people to amend the Constitution by a simple
majority vote in a national referendum. His argument is based on the so-called
"first principle" of the American Revolution that underlies the Declaration of
Independence: that the people are sovereign and that they always retain the
right to alter their form of government as they see fit.86 However, Amar is
unpersuasive in claiming that the Framers would have accepted amendment by
national referendum either as wise or as constitutionally valid.
There are three basic flaws in Amar's argument. First, he argues that
popular sovereignty rhetoric in the state constitutions of 1776-1780 may be
transposed into the later federal Constitution, and that such rhetoric should be
82. THOMAS PAINE, The Rights of Man, pt. 2, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 49, 168 (Bruce Kuklick ed.,
1989).
83. Given their disdain for popular participation in normal government decisionmaking, it is likely that
most Federalists held the same view with regard to popular involvement in the amendment process. Indeed,
had they felt that the people were somehow more competent to make constitutional decisions, they would
have certainly pointed this out. Vernon Parrington summarized the Federalist position with regard to both
regular government and the amendment process: "An honest appeal to the people was the last thing desired
by the Federalists, and the democratic machinery of recalls and referendums and rotation in office, which
had developed during the war, was stigmatized as factional devices which in the end must destroy good
government." 1 VERNON L. PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 286 (1927).
84. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LXIII, reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS 443,449 (William F. Swindler ed., 1973) [hereinafter CONSTITtUTIONS]; MASS. CONST. of
1780, pt. II, ch. VI, art. X, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 92, 108-09.
85. See Walcoff, supra note 63, at 1532.
86. See Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1043 (1988) [hereinafter Amar, Philadelphia Revisited]; Akhil R. Amar, The Consent of the
Governed: ConstitutionalAmendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994) [hereinafter Amar,
The Consent of the Governed]. Although Amar's right to amend via referendum is not specifically
enumerated, he attempts to give a textual basis by grounding it in the wording of the Preamble and the
First, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments. Id. at 462, 489-94.
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understood as both proclaiming a preexisting right of the people to alter their
form of government and implying that ballot issues approved by the national
electorate would be valid constitutional amendments.8 7 However, the validity
of his textual transposition is undermined by the fact that many of the state
constitutions accompanied such platitudes with specific provisions allowing for
direct popular involvement in the amendment process. 88 The Framers of the
federal Constitution included neither the platitudes, nor the provisions.8 9
Second, Amar overlooks the massive shift in attitude that occurred between
the Revolutionary War period and 1787.90 He suggests that the concepts of
popular sovereignty underlying the Declaration of Independence and the state
constitutions of 1776-1780 may be regarded as part and parcel of the U.S.
Constitution.91 However, as Gordon Wood concluded in his canonical history
87. See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 86, at 1049-56, 1060-65; Amar, The Consent of the
Governed, supra note 86, at 458-59, 477-81.
88. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LXIII, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 84, at 443, 449
(requiring that amendment proposals gain signatures from majority of voters in majority of counties); MASS.
CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. VI, art. X, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 84, at 92, 108-09
(requiring affirmative vote of two-thirds of all voters in order to call amending convention); N.H. CONST.
of 1784, pt. II, par. 86, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 84, at 344, 357 (requiring proposed
amendment to win two-thirds majority in referendum); PA. CONST. of 1776, § 47, reprinted in 2 THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES 1540, 1548 (B. Perley Poore ed., Washington, Gov't Printing Off., 2d ed. 1878) (providing
expressly for popular instruction of delegates attending future conventions to amend constitution); VT.
CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § XLIV, reprinted in 9 CONSTrUTIONS, supra note 84, at 487, 495 (same). With
the one exception of Delaware, those state constitutions which did not include such specific provisions in
their original form were amended later to provide for direct voting on proposed amendments. See supra
note 14 and accompanying text.
89. Amar also argues that support for his view can be found in the two unamendable provisions of
the Constitution stipulated in Article V, because if Article V had been viewed by the Framers as the
exclusive mode of amendment, then the people would have alienated their inalienable right to amend in
these areas-a logical impossibility. See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 86, at 1068-69. This
argument is a weak one. The two entrenched provisos merely imply that, short of abandoning the entire
Constitution (which is in no way prohibited by Article V), the specified elements may not be omitted. In
other words, while piecemeal amendment is prohibited, a total overhaul is still allowed. Therefore, the
people did not alienate an inalienable right. Complete abandonment of the Constitution may be
meaningfully distinguished from piecemeal amendment in two important respects: the former signals to the
public a complete change of governmental regime, and it arguably results in sovereignty reverting to the
people of the states (as opposed to the people of the nation).
90. Amar discusses an "evolution" of popular sovereignty principles between 1776 and 1789, whereby
revolutionary violence was replaced by peaceful, lawful processes. Amar, The Consent of the Governed,
supra note 86, at 462-64. However, this assessment fails to recognize what was actually a rejection of many
of the populist political theories of 1776-1780.
91. See Amar, The Consent of the Governed, supra note 86, at 457-64, 475-88; Amar, Philadelphia
Revisited, supra note 86, at 1049-54. Amar's suggestion that the ideas of the Declaration of Independence
were incorporated into the Constitution is particularly shaky, given that the ratifiers of the Constitution
evidently did not think so. Among the amendments to the Constitution proposed by the Virginia ratifying
convention was one which paraphrased the Declaration: "That there are certain natural rights, of which
men, when they form a social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity; among which are the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and
pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." Additions Proposed by the Virginia Convention (June 27,
1788), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 219 (Ralph
Ketcham ed., 1986). Clearly, the ratifiers in Virginia did not regard the doctrines underlying the Declaration
as implied or assumed in the Constitution; if they had, they would have felt no need to propose such an
amendment.
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of the Founding, the Constitution of 1787 was in a very real sense a
"[r]epudiation of 1776."92 In drafting the Constitution, the Federalists
consciously rejected the radical political theories that had been popular during
the Revolutionary War and proposed instead "a startling strengthening of the
rulers' power at the expense of the people's participation in the
government. ' 93 Amar cites Wood selectively,94 but neglects to mention the
historian's overall conclusion, one that seriously weakens Amar's thesis.
Third and most important, Amar relies heavily on a litany of quotations
from the Founding period that affirm, in general terms, the right of "the
people" to alter their form of government. 95 He asserts that we may
extrapolate from this language of popular sovereignty an endorsement of
amendment via direct popular vote.96 However, the vast majority of the
passages cited by Amar actually refer to the people as represented by a
constitutional convention, not the people voting directly.97 Amar's use of
certain quotations is particularly misleading. For example, he quotes Madison
in The Federalist as follows: "the 'Constitution is to be founded on the assent
and ratification of the people of America... [and] derived from the supreme
authority in each State-the authority of the people themselves."' 98 Here,
Amar's ellipsis conceals, among other things, the important qualifying clause:
"given by deputies elected for the special purpose." 99 When the Framers
referred to constitutional amendment by "the people," they were speaking of
constitutional conventions.'00 Amar's reference to the speeches of James
Iredell at the North Carolina ratifying convention is similarly misleading.
Attempting to demonstrate that the ratifiers recognized a broad popular right
to alter govemment-a right that encompassed amendment via
92. See WOOD, supra note 66, at 519.
93. Id. at 523.
94. See Amar, The Consent of the Governed, supra note 86, at 459 n.6, 460 n.8, 474 n.56, 475 n.61,
476 nn.64-65, 479 n.77, 483-84 nn.92-97, 494 n.140, 507 n.178.
95. See, e.g., id. at 470-71, 475-80, 491-93.
96. See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 86, at 1044-45, 1048 n.13, 1065; Amar, The Consent
of the Governed, supra note 86, at 457-59.
97. The only Framer whose references to "the people" in this sense might actually have encompassed
the people acting directly is James Wilson, upon whom Amar relies heavily. See Amar, The Consent of the
Governed, supra note 86, at 473-75, 490. However, Wilson's remarks are ambiguous; and Amar offers no
example in which direct popular action via referendum is clearly endorsed. In his 1988 article, Amar
acknowledges that a "major difference" between ratification at the Founding and ratification in his proposed
scheme is the latter's replacement of conventions with referendums, but he declines to explore the
distinction. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 86, at 1064. In 1994, he merely notes that modem
communications technology may allow referendum campaigns to be as deliberative as conventions. Amar,
The Consent of the Governed, supra note 86, at 502-03.
98. Amar, The Consent of the Governed, supra note 86, at 473 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at
243 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
99. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 243 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). In addition, Amar's
ellipsis conceals Madison's explanation that "this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not
as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which
they respectively belong." Id.
100. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 103: 19711990
Rethinking Article V
referendum-Amar offers an ambiguous passage from Iredell: "The same
authority that created can destroy; and the people may undoubtedly change the
government ... ."I0' However, Amar neglects to point out that during the
same convention Iredell stated precisely how the people would make such
changes: "That power which created the government can destroy it. Should the
government, on trial, be found to want amendments, those amendments can be
made in a regular method, in a mode prescribed by the Constitution itself.' 02
Iredell contemplated amendment through the mechanism stipulated in the text,
not through an unenumerated right of referendum based on the theory of
popular sovereignty. The Framers and the Federalists clearly endorsed
amendment through state- and national-level conventions acting on behalf of
the people. Just as clearly, they rejected amendment through direct popular
votes.
There is, however, another possible objection to this Note's conclusion that
the Framers rejected popular involvement in the amendment process: this
reading of the Framers would be anachronistic if referendums were not even
part of the political vocabulary in 1787. If the Framers had really considered
referendums, one might argue, then they surely would have endorsed them.
This objection is easily answered. The Framers were familiar with referendums
in three contemporary contexts. First, constitutional referendums at the state
level had already occurred by the time of the 1787 Convention, 3 and the
Convention delegates were undoubtedly familiar with these votes. In fact,
Madison mentioned the use of the referendum in the adoption of existing state
constitutions in The Federalist, when he insisted that the reference to the
people of constitutional questions regarding the proper bounds of government
institutions was generally "neither a proper nor an effectual provision."'" He
excepted the earlier cases because they came at a time when a revolutionary
spirit and the British menace had served to focus the public mind. 5
101. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 230
(Salem, N.H., AYER Co. reprint ed. 1987) (Jonathan Elliot ed., New York, Burt Franklin 1888) [hereinafter
ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (statement of James Iredell), quoted with unindicated omissions, in Amar, The Consent
of the Governed, supra note 86, at 476.
102. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 101, at 130 (statement of James Iredell).
103. In Massachusetts, state legislators had placed a newly drafted state constitution before the people
in 1778 (when it was defeated overwhelmingly) and 1780 (when a revised version passed). KOBACH, supra
note 13, at 236; see also Ranney, supra note 13, at 68-69. Similarly, New Hampshire voters had
participated in constitutional referendums in 1779 and 1783. Ranney, supra note 13, at 69.
104. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 258 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
105. In Madison's words:
[Tihe experiments are of too ticklish a nature to be unnecessarily multiplied. We are to recollect
that all the existing constitutions were formed in the midst of a danger which repressed the
passions most unfriendly to order and concord; of an enthusiastic confidence of the people in
their patriotic leaders, which stifled the ordinary diversity of opinions on great national
questions .... The future situations in which we must expect to be usually placed, do not
present any equivalent security against the danger which is apprehended.
Id. at 256.
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The Framers also knew that the very document they were drafting might
face a referendum in one or two states. Early during the debates of 1787,
Alexander Hamilton drew the delegates' attention to the fact that the Senate
of New York had nearly adopted a proviso whereby no act of the
Constitutional Convention could be binding until it was referred to and ratified
by the voters of the state. The New York motion had failed by only one
vote." 6 In the end, only Rhode Island subjected the proposed federal
constitution to a popular vote. 7 Defying the convention mechanism
stipulated in Article VII,'0 8 the General Assembly of that state called for a
referendum on the document in March 1788, when it was defeated
overwhelmingly by a vote of 237 for and 2708 against ratification.0 9
Finally, in an early effort at comparative political science, many of the
Framers had done their homework before coming to the Convention by
studying the various forms of government existing in Europe. For centuries,
several Swiss cantons had operated successfully under the Landsgemeinde
system, whereby decisions of the cantonal governments were required to win
popular consent in direct votes."0 The Framers were well aware of the Swiss
model."' In sum, the referendum device was not overlooked by the
Convention delegates of 1787. Thus, their omission of direct democracy from
the amending process was almost certainly deliberate. The people were deemed
too ill-informed and passionate to play a direct role in proposing or ratifying
constitutional change.
It is against this backdrop that we must view the process that led to the
adoption of the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments and that may
eventually lead to a federal constitutional amendment imposing congressional
term limits. Contrary to the Framers' plan, the direct consent of voters played
a crucial role in the passage of the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments.
106. MADISON, supra note 67, at 130.
107. Ralph Ketcham, Antifederalist Essays and Speeches: 1787-1788, in ROOTS OF THE REPUBLIC:
AMERICAN FOUNDING DOCUMENTS INTERPRETED 381, 383 (Stephen L. Schechter ed., 1990). Federalists
in the major towns of Newport and Providence boycotted the referendum. See id. at 382-83.
108. "The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of
this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same." U.S. CONST. art. VII.
109. Or 8% in favor. Only two towns, Bristol and Little Compton, saw a majority in favor of the new
federal constitution. The polling of eligible Rhode Island freemen and freeholders took place at town
meetings held throughout the state on the fourth Monday of March in 1788. 10 RECORDS OF THE STATE
OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS IN NEW ENGLAND 271-75 (John R. Bartlett ed.,
Providence, Providence Press Co. 1865). The U.S. Constitution took effect without the approval of Rhode
Island, a situation which engendered considerable uncertainty and mistrust between the First Congress and
that state. Eventually, a Rhode Island ratification convention was called to assemble in April 1790.
Debating for nearly a month, the delegates finally decided to ratify the Constitution by a two-vote margin,
34-32. Richard B. Bemstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 531 (1992).
110. KOBACH, supra note 13, at 16-17.
111. Indeed, during the Convention debates, George Mason, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison,
James Wilson, Luther Martin, and Charles Pinckney all made reference to aspects of the Swiss political
system. See 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 63, at 112, 285-86, 307, 317, 343, 454; 3 id. at 115.
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In a very real sense, popular consent was required. The people voting in state
referendums passed decisive judgment on both amendments. Neither would
have been adopted at the time in the absence of strong popular endorsement
through the referendum mechanism. Furthermore, Congress would never have
"proposed" either amendment if the necessary restructuring of Congress had
not been achieved through direct voter action in state referendums. Similarly
today, Congress will never "propose"' a term limits amendment unless voters
succeed in imposing term limits on their state delegations through amendments
to their state constitutions, and such amendments require approval by
referendum." 2 Thus, there now exists an alternative to the amendment routes
envisioned by the Framers, one in which direct voter consent is essential.
The development of this alternative path should be viewed in the context
of the larger cultural and institutional environment. The incremental
amendment process that led to the popular election of Senators and to woman
suffrage was part of a significant political metamorphosis of the republic which
occurred in the wake of populism and during the reign of progressivism. By
1918, voters in twenty-three states were armed with either the right to initiate
state legislation directly or the right to overrule legislative acts or both."
3
The almost exclusively representative democracy of the Framers had given way
to a system with a mix of representation and direct democracy. The franchise
had been broadened markedly; the various property qualifications that existed
in the states in 1787 had been eliminated by 1856.114 And with the
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, universal manhood suffrage
had become a (legal) reality. Combined with the weakening of class structures
and the expansion of public education, these developments created an
environment in which it was only natural that citizens should enjoy a direct
role in the process of constitutional amendment.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, on the few occasions in which it has
considered the direct involvement of citizens in the federal amendment process,
has consistently preserved the Framers' intentions. In the middle of the
nineteenth century, the Court confirmed Article V's exclusion of direct popular
action in Dodge v. Woolsey:115
[The Constitution] is supreme over the people of the United States,
aggregately and in their separate sovereignties, because they have
excluded themselves from any direct or immediate agency in making
amendments to it, and have directed that amendments should be made
representatively for them, by the congress of the United States, when
two thirds of both houses shall propose them; or where the
112. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
113. THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND
RECALL 50-54 (1989).
114. CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 213 (1944).
115. 59 U.S. 331 (1855).
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legislatures of two thirds of the several States shall call a convention
for proposing amendments .... 116
The Court reiterated this understanding of the amendment process in 1920
in Hawke v. Smith, 17 a case brought in Ohio by proponents of the
Eighteenth Amendment (establishing Prohibition). The voters of Ohio had
previously amended the state constitution to require a referendum approving
any decision of the state legislature to ratify a federal constitutional
amendment. If the voters rejected the amendment, the legislature's decision to
ratify would be void. Twenty-two states had similar laws at the time."8 As
it happened, the people of Ohio had narrowly rejected their legislature's
decision to ratify the Eighteenth Amendment. 119 The Court ruled that the
state of Ohio had no authority to require that ratification be subject to popular
approval because the state's power of ratification was derived from the federal
Constitution and was not susceptible to modification at the state level. 20 The
Court's opinion reflected the notion that ratification by "Legislatures," as
provided in Article V, does not include ratification by a legislature acting
under the direction of a binding referendum. Justice Day took the opportunity
to dispel any illusions about the role of referendums in the amendment process:
"The framers of the Constitution might have adopted a different method.
Ratification might have been left to a vote of the people, or to some authority
of government other than that selected. The language of the article is plain, and
admits of no doubt in its interpretation.''
The only direct popular role in the amendment process that has been
sanctioned formally by the Supreme Court is that of the nonbinding,
"advisory" referendum. In Kimble v. Swackhamer, Justice Rehnquist, acting as
Circuit Justice, refused to enjoin Nevada's advisory referendum on the
ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment. 22 However, he justified his
action by referring to the nonbinding character of the plebiscite. Since it
imposed no obligation upon the legislature to follow the will of the voters, he
regarded it as the equivalent of communication between legislators and their
constituents and therefore within the boundaries of Article V.23
116. Id. at 348.
117. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
118. CAT & SHULER, supra note 40, at 366.
119. The ratification decision was rejected by a margin of less than 500 votes. Id. at 414.
120. 253 U.S. at 230-31.
121. Id. at 227. The California Supreme Court applied the same logic to applications for a
constitutional convention in 1984 when it held that "a state may not, by initiative or otherwise, compel its
legislators to apply for a constitutional convention, or to refrain from such action. Under Article V, the
legislators must be free to vote their own considered judgment." AFL-CIO v. Eu, 686 P.2d 609, 622 (Cal.
1984).
122. 439 U.S. 1385 (1978) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice).
123. Id. at 1387-88.
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Judicial interpretations of Article V have consistently rejected any decisive
popular involvement in the amendment process. Yet, the passage of the
Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments depended upon direct popular
involvement at several stages. In the majority of states, voters deliberated at
length and passed judgment on the amendments to be enacted in their
respective states. These actions eventually altered the structural interests of
Congress so that it would endorse the amendments. In many states where
citizens retained the power of initiative, voters not only passed judgment on
the amendments as applied in their state, they also raised them to the agenda
in the first place. While the final stages of formal ratification proceeded
according to the letter of Article V, it can hardly be argued that the process
that led to the amendments' adoption reflected the principle of representation
stressed by the Framers. Ironically, the courts have acted to affirm this
principle both during the Progressive era and in recent years-even while
contemporary events were rendering it largely irrelevant.
B. Agreement Between National-Level and State-Level Majorities
A second structural characteristic of Article V, in addition to its exclusion
of direct voter action, is the way it combines proposal of amendments at the
national level and ratification at the state level. At both levels, the assent of a
majority (in most cases, a supermajority) is required. 4 The Constitution may
not be unilaterally altered either by Congress or by a group of state
legislatures, no matter how numerous. Rather, the Framers required a
concurrence of interests between state- and national-level assemblies
(legislatures or conventions). Each tier would be free from constraint by the
other, and each would possess the power to defeat reforms sought by the other.
Writing in defense of Article V, Madison stressed this blending of state and
national functions:
If we try the Constitution by its last relation, to the authority by
which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly national,
nor wholly federal. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate
authority would reside in the majority of the people of the Union; and
this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority
of every national society, to alter or abolish its established
Government. Were it wholly federal on the other hand, the
124. The one instance in which Article V does not expressly require a supermajority is in the decisions
of a national proposing convention. The Framers included in Article V no explicit guidance as to the
procedural rules that such a convention should follow in offering amendment proposals to the states. This
omission probably reflects the Framers' own experience at the Convention of 1787, which set its own
procedural rules. Decisions were made by simple majority, with each state's delegation entitled to cast one
vote. I CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 63, at 2, 7-11.
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concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential to every
alteration that would be binding on all."z
It could be argued that the Framers did not require meaningful
involvement at the national level in those instances when a proposing
convention would be called. But this kind of argument would regard the
national convention as little more than a proxy for the state governments,
bound to propose whatever amendment the states might stipulate in their calls
for a convention or in their subsequent instructions to convention delegates.
This view of the proposing convention as being "limited" by the specific state
resolutions that called it into being is highly contested and divides the legal
academe sharply.12 6 The idea of a limited convention is particularly dubious
in light of the fact that the delegates to the 1787 Convention rejected the
concept with regard to their own endeavor. Rather than merely propose
amendments to the Articles of Confederation, the delegates in Philadelphia
took it upon themselves to draft an entirely new system of government. Rather
than observe the Articles' requirement of unanimity between the states in the
adoption of amendments, they asserted the validity of the proposed constitution
upon the assent of only nine states.'2 7
It is unlikely that the Framers would have endorsed any amendment
mechanism that allowed state-level representatives to dominate the process,
given their overt disdain for state legislators. The Federalists described state
legislators in derogatory terms-"men of no genius or abilities" who were
doing a poor job of running "the machine of government."' 128 Alexander
Hamilton expressed this sentiment openly in the 1787 Convention when he
rejected the suggestion that all amendments be initiated by state legislatures:
"The State Legislatures will not apply for alterations but with a view to
increase their own powers- The National Legislature will be the first to
125. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 194-95 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982). Modem writers
have also drawn attention to the two-tiered character of the amendment process. See, e.g., MARCIA L.
WHICKER Er AL., THE CONSTITUTION UNDER PRESSURE: A TIME FOR CHANGE 106-07 (1987).
126. See, e.g., RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKSMANSHIP 95-101 (1988) (conventions
may be limited); Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE
L.J. 189 (1972) (petitions for limited conventions are invalid); Walter Dellinger, The Recurring Question
of the "Limited" Constitutional Convention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623 (1979) (petitions for limited conventions
are invalid, and conventions may consider any agenda they wish); Gerald Gunther, The Convention Method
of Amending the United States Constitution, 14 GA. L. REa. 1 (1979) (petitions for limited conventions are
valid, but conventions are not bound to limit themselves to terms of such petitions); William Van Alstyne,
Does Article V Restrict the States to Calling Unlimited Conventions Only?-A Letter to a Colleague, 1978
DUKE L.J. 1295 (petitions for limited conventions are valid).
127. James Madison openly conceded that the Convention delegates had "departed from the tenor of
their commission." THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 199 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982). But he
maintained that such a departure was permissible, arguing that "if they had violated both their powers and
their obligations, in proposing a Constitution, this ought nevertheless to be embraced, if it be calculated to
accomplish the views and happiness of the people of America." Id. at 202.
128. WOOD, supra note 66, at 507 (quoting GAZETrE OF THE STATE OF SOUTH-CAROLINA, Jan. 3,
1785).
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perceive and will be most sensible to the necessity of amendments .... "'29
Patrick Henry noted this prejudice of the Federalists when he spoke before the
Virginia ratifying convention: "The Constitution reflects in the most degrading
and mortifying manner on the virtue, integrity, and wisdom of the state
legislatures; it presupposes that the chosen few who go to Congress will have
more upright hearts, and more enlightened minds, than those who are members
of the individual legislatures."'
30
Accordingly, the Framers reserved the task of conceiving and drafting
proposed amendments to a national-level assembly, be it Congress or a
convention. They reasoned that there was a limited number of statesmen who
(like themselves) were sufficiently wise, educated, and civic-minded to grapple
with the issues involved in proposing alterations to the Constitution. The
problem, as Jonathan Jackson saw it, was how to convey "authority to those,
and those only, who by nature, education, and good dispositions, are qualified
for government."'' The solution that the Federalists arrived at was to widen
the electoral base of those who would govern. While unprincipled, obscure,
and narrow-minded individuals might win election to local office or to the state
legislatures, elections to national representative assemblies would filter out
such candidates. 32 Similarly, the Framers envisioned that persons elected to
a national convention would be the most qualified to draft amendments to the
Constitution and the most able to promote broad, national interests. 33 In
sum, it is doubtful that the Framers intended to empower the states to alter the
Constitution absent the guidance of Congress or a national convention.
Now we come to the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments. The novel
path of constitutional change that these amendments followed is difficult to
align with the Framers' preference for concurrence between state- and
national-level assemblies. The incongruity is evident in two respects: in the
effective transformation of the constitutional framework without any
national-level assent during the initial stages of incremental amendment, and
129. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 63, at 558.
130. Patrick Henry before the Virginia ratifying convention, in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 101,
at 167.
131. WOOD, supra note 66, at 510 (quoting JONATHAN JACKSON, THOUGHTS UPON THE POLITICAL
SITUATION (1788)).
132. As John Jay argued, "more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications,
will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national government-especially as it will have
the widest field for choice, and never experience that want of proper persons, which is not uncommon in
some of the States." THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at I I (John Jay) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
133. The one contemporary exception was the proposal of 12 amendments by the First Congress in
1789, 10 of which became the first 10 amendments to the Constitution. Congress selected these 12 from
a large pool of amendment proposals submitted by various states. However, unique circumstances
surrounded the states' suggestion of these amendments. Numerous state convention debates on the
ratification of the Constitution had reached an impasse, with Federalists arguing that the Constitution should
be ratified as it stood and Anti-Federalists insisting on various changes as a precondition for ratification.
Finally, a compromise was reached at the Massachusetts convention in February 1788 and copied in other
states. Recommended amendments would be submitted along with a state's ratification, and the Federalists
would agree to support their proposal by the First Congress. See Bernstein, supra note 109, at 513.
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in the practical constraints which the states place upon Congress' subsequent
deliberations through the process of incremental amendment. Consider the first
respect. The process of incremental amendment produces substantial structural
transformation at the national level without any congressional assent. Indeed,
with the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments, the state-by-state
modifications of the electoral basis of members of Congress were adopted in
the face of overt congressional hostility to the reforms.' 34 By the time
Congress "proposed" the amendments, Congress itself had already been
transformed significantly. In the case of the Seventeenth Amendment, voters
in twenty-eight states were already effectively electing their Senators by the
time Congress assented to the. change. As for the Nineteenth Amendment,
Congressmen from fifteen states were being elected by women, and women in
thirty-one states were able to vote for President. The system of national
government had already been significantly reconstituted. The same is true with
state-imposed congressional term limits. Assuming that the state actions are
held to be constitutional, the clock has already started running on the
congressional delegations of fifteen states. For 156 House members and 30
Senators, term limits are a constitutional reality even though Congress has
taken no action in favor of the reform. The concurrence of state- and
national-level majorities has not been necessary in order to amend the
Constitution incrementally.
These state-initiated changes also bind Congress in the later stages of the
alternative amendment path. When Congress finally capitulates and considers
seriously the proposal of an Article V amendment (in the third stage of the
process), it finds itself significantly constrained in two ways. It has already
been restructured in favor of the proposed reform; many members of Congress
have been elected under the new rules and vested with an inherent interest in
their continuance. 135 Moreover, when Congress finally takes action in stage
three of this alternative amendment route, the terms of the debate have already
been set and cannot be altered easily. In these circumstances, Congress
effectively loses the power to propose amendments and can only assent to
them. For example, in 1918 Congress could not have proposed realistically that
suffrage be extended only to women meeting a minimum educational
134. Bruce Ackerman has suggested that the passage of the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments illustrates the "vibrancy of the Congressionally led modes of constitutional
transformation during the period." I BRUCE ACKERMAN, vE THE PEOPLE 85 (1991). However, this was
clearly not the case with the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments; Congress opposed both reforms for
decades, coming around only in the final hour. See supra Parts III-IV.
135. The pressure generated by this structural bias is of a greater magnitude than that created by
routine reelection concerns. For example, a Congressman in a state that had recently adopted woman
suffrage faced powerful pressures compelling him to support the proposal of the Nineteenth Amendment.
By voting against it, he risked alienating the female voters in his constituency, and he took a position
contrary to that favored by the male voters in a recent referendum. Furthermore, if he felt that the new
arrangement in his state imposed any burden or cost upon him, he presumably wished to equalize the
situation across the country by imposing the same burden upon all other members of Congress.
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requirement. That was not what the states had endorsed. They had adopted a
proposal to enfranchise women on the same terms as men. It was too late in
the debate for Congress to propose a different amendment. Rather, Congress
was relegated to a position in which it could only accept or reject a proposal
already adopted by a large number of states.
V. THE PROBLEM OF CONGRESSIONAL SELF-INTEREST
This alternative path of amendment emerged to overcome an
overwhelming structural barrier to amending the Constitution in a way that
conflicts with the inherent self-interest of members of Congress. Because
Congress' opposition to such reforms is structural, rather than merely partisan
or ideological, this opposition cannot be defeated simply by electing new
members to Congress. Instead, Congress itself must first be restructured to
eliminate its innate institutional bias against the reform.
The problem of Congressional resistance to such amendments is not a new
or unforeseen one. The Framers considered this very issue in their deliberations
over the amendment process. On the third day of the Convention, Edmund
Randolph broached the issue when he presented the Virginia Plan, a collection
of resolutions that became the foundation of the Convention's work. The
thirteenth resolution of the Plan stated simply "that provision ought to be made
for the amendment of the Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem
necessary, and that the assent of the National Legislature ought not to be
required thereto."' 36 Virginia's George Mason was a strident advocate of this
approach; he stressed that "[i]t would be improper to require the consent of the
Nat[ional] Legislature, because they may abuse their power, and refuse their
consent on that very account."' 37 This concept of an amendment process
without decisive congressional involvement survived basically intact in the
second proposal on the subject-Article XIX of the Report of the Committee
of Detail, which stated that: "On the application of the Legislatures of two
thirds of the States in the Union, for an amendment of this Constitution, the
Legislature of the United States shall call a Convention for that purpose.'
38
Eventually, James Madison directly challenged this proposal and the basic
premise of the Virginia Plan's amendment scheme. He offered his own plan,
under which Congress would propose all amendments "whenever two thirds
of both Houses shall deem [it] necessary, or on the application of two thirds
of the Legislatures of the several States."' 39 Enactment would require the
136. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 63, at 22. Charles Pinckney responded to this plan by
questioning the necessity of any provision for amendment. Id. at 121; see also MADISON, supra note 67,
at 69.
137. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 63, at 203.
138. 2 id. at 188.
139. 2 id. at 559.
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assent of three-fourths of the state legislatures or state ratifying conventions,
as specified by Congress.140 Under the Madison plan, all routes would pass
through Congress-the only body entitled to propose amendments. This plan
drew criticism from several quarters, but the most vehement disparagement
came from George Mason. On the penultimate day of the Convention, Mason
predicted that under Madison's framework "no amendments of the proper kind
would ever be obtained by the people, if the Government should become
oppressive," which he "verily believed would be the case.,' 4
A compromise was offered by Elbridge Gerry and Gouverneur Morris as
a modification of the Madison plan. Their alteration allowed for proposal
either by Congress or by a national convention at the request of two-thirds of
the states. 42 Madison felt that the change was unnecessary and pointed out
that difficulties might arise in determining the procedural rules governing such
a convention. 43 Nonetheless, the modification was accepted; the amended
Madison plan would be incorporated into the Constitution as Article V.
Mason ultimately refused to sign the Constitution in part because he
believed that even the revised Madison plan gave Congress too much control
over the amendment process.'" He described the potential power of
Congress to obstruct amendments as "a Doctrine utterly subversive of the
fundamental Principles of the Rights [and] Liberties of the people."'145
Mason's fear that Congress might prove unwilling to reform itself was echoed
in the ratification debates of 1787-1788. George Bryan, a leading Pennsylvania
Anti-Federalist, stated the problem plainly in 1787:
[W]e shall never find two thirds of a Congress voting or proposing
any thing which shall derogate from their own authority and
importance, or agreeing to give back to the people any part of those
privileges which they have once parted with-so far from it; that the
greater occasion there may be for a reformation, the less likelihood
will there be of accomplishing it. The greater the abuse of power, the
more obstinately is it always persisted in.
146
140. Id.
141. 2 id. at 629.
142. Id.
143. Nonetheless, Madison opposed the inclusion of more specific provisions in the text because he
felt that such detailed stipulations "in Constitutional regulations ought to be as much as possible avoided."
2 id. at 630.
144. This and other aspects of the evolving text prompted Mason to insist, along with Edmund
Randolph, that the state ratifying conventions be allowed to proffer changes to the proposed Constitution.
Such changes would then be considered by a second constitutional convention. Unless this concession was
made, the two men would refuse to sign the Constitution. Their effort at brinkmanship failed. Willing to
part with the two Virginians' support, the Convention voted unanimously against allowing the state
conventions to offer revisions for the consideration of a second national convention. See 2 id. at 629-33.
145. SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND'S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 270
(James H. Hutson ed., 1987).
146. George Bryan et al., An Old Whig, INDEPENDENT GAZEITEER, Oct. 12, 1787, reprinted in I THE
DEBATE ON THE CONSTTTON 122, 123-24 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993).
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Hamilton was well aware of this apprehension regarding Article V. He
presented his response in the final paper of the Federalist series:
In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments, it has
been urged, that the persons delegated to the administration of the
national government, will always be disinclined to yield up any
portion of the authority of which they were once possessed. . .. I
think there is no weight in the observation just stated. . . . The
intrinsic difficulty of governing THIRTEEN STATES at any rate,
independent of calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit
and integrity, will, in my opinion, constantly impose on the national
rulers the necessity of a spirit of accommodation to the reasonable
expectations of their constituents.
147
History has not vindicated Hamilton's optimistic expectations. On many
occasions, members of Congress have had a direct stake in an aspect of the
status quo threatened by a proposed amendment. In such instances, their
unwillingness to agree to the reform has been monumental. Mason's ghost
continues to haunt the Constitution; indeed, his warnings are more relevant
today than ever.
The Gerry-Morris compromise embodied in Article V attempted to correct
this problem by providing a second road of amendment free from
congressional obstruction. 148  Unfortunately, this endeavor failed; the
convention road has proven impassable. There have been nearly four hundred
attempts to set the convention mechanism of Article V in motion.'49 Yet,
none has succeeded.5 Pervasive fears of a "runaway" convention meddling
with hallowed parts of the Constitution have made it politically impossible to
persuade two-thirds of the states to demand a convention on a particular
issue.' 51 On numerous occasions, the number of applications has cbme within
three or four states of reaching the two-thirds mark. Yet each time the process
has ground to a halt. Opposition to the substance of a sought-after amendment
solidifies and combines with ubiquitous dread of a runaway convention.'52
147. THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 448 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
148. Of course, even the national constitutional convention route runs through Congress in a limited
sense, since Congress alone is empowered to "call" the convention. U.S. CONST. art. V.
149. There have been 399 applications to date. Paulsen, supra note 10, at 736 n.199.
150. More than 70 of the 399 applications were intended to bring about the direct election of Senators.
See Frank J. Sorauf, The Political Potential of an Amending Convention, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION AS AN AMENDING DEVICE 113, 114 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1981). No doubt, these
repeated failures were instrumental in driving advocates of direct election to explore the alternative route
which ultimately led them to their intended destination. Michael Paulsen has argued recently that, in light
of the Tventy-Seventh Amendment's ratification over a period of 203 years, Congress should reassess the
counting rules and cumulate the hundreds of valid state applications for a constitutional convention. He
maintains that Congress must call a convention now. See Paulsen, supra note 10, at 735-37.
151. See Sorauf, supra note 150, at 118. It should be noted that the Constitutional Convention of 1787
was just such a runaway convention.
152. See id. at 115-16.
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Such fears are not the only barrier to a convention. Congress has employed
its own tactics to place the mechanism further out of reach, thus ensuring its
monopoly over the power to propose amendments. Chief among these is its
consistent refusal to pass an implementation bill defining valid petitions from
the states, setting time limits on when the two-thirds mark must be reached,
and detailing the procedures of a convention. 53 Beginning in 1971 with a
bill proposed by Senator Sam Ervin, every attempt to define rules for a
potential convention has been defeated by members of Congress unwilling to
encourage convention applications by removing the veil of uncertainty. These
obstacles make it unlikely that a national convention will ever occur.'54
Thus, insurmountable barriers have effectively rendered the national
constitutional convention route useless. As a result, Congress must approve any
successful amendment under Article V-even one meant to address structural
defects in the constitution of Congress itself. As demonstrated by the nation's
experience with the popular election of Senators, woman suffrage, and now
term limits, members of Congress will act to defeat amendments that threaten
their structural interests. Herein lies the fundamental importance of the
alternative amendment path. It provides a mechanism by which the states may
effectively enact an amendment state by state and thereby restructure Congress
itself. In this way, Congress' refusal to reform itself can be overcome.
VI. A RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE AMENDMENT PROCESS
The proposal and ratification of the Seventeenth and Nineteenth
Amendments were clearly not unconstitutional. The formal requirements of
Article V were satisfied: two-thirds of Congress did something which it called
"proposing," and three-fourths of the state legislatures voted to "ratify" the
amendments. From a purely positivist point of view, there is nothing unusual
about these amendments. But the structural incongruities refuse to disappear.
The amendment process in these two instances proceeded by a route
dramatically different from that envisioned by the authors of Article V. 55
These structural incongruities may be resolved by recognizing that Article
V has evolved as America has changed. The elitist notions of the Framers
reflected the world in which they lived. Their conception of the American
citizenry is no longer descriptively correct. Now, the great majority of the
nation's population possesses a basic education, and whatever one thinks of the
performance of state legislatures, their members are selected from much larger
and more educated pools. Direct popular involvement in government
decisionmaking has long existed at the state level. And although direct
153. See id. at 117-23.
154. Id. at 126.
155. See supra Part IV.
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democracy has its deficiencies, it is difficult to claim that the citizenry remains
incompetent to pass judgment on national constitutional amendments.'56
These changes in the nature of American society contributed directly to the
vigor of the Populist and Progressive movements. Repudiating the Framers'
conception of elite-led democracy, Americans embraced the participation of
ordinary citizens in fundamental political decisions. Consequently, a
reconceptualization of the amendment process occurred, in which citizens
pushed their way through the doors that had previously been closed to them.
Using devices of direct democracy recently adopted at the state level, citizens
paved an alternative route of amendment, one which was enough like Article
V on the surface to pass constitutional muster but was very different
underneath. This reconceptualization of higher lawmaking allowed a greater
role for direct citizen participation within the formal boundaries of Article
V.1
57
The fact that we now recognize the Seventeenth and Nineteenth
Amendments as valid invites us to consider the broader implications of this
procedural innovation. Although these amendments were not enacted in the
spirit of Article V as envisioned by the Framers, they did conform to the letter
of the text. Consequently, the uncontested validity of these amendments
legitimates an alternative understanding of the structural requirements of
Article V. We should now put this alternative structural understanding to work
by reinterpreting Article V to allow both direct popular voting on proposed
amendments and state-level leadership in incremental transformations. To do
otherwise is to deny the history of the Seventeenth and Nineteenth
Amendments. In this way, a synthesis of the amendment mechanism conceived
in the Founding era and the amendment practice developed in the Progressive
era can be achieved.
The judiciary should recognize that a broad reconceptualization of the
amendment process has occurred. Judicial understandings of Article V that
reflect the elitist prejudices of the Framers, who held direct popular
involvement in amending the Constitution to be dangerous, are not essential
for a meaningful interpretation of the Article. The formal amending rules of
156. See CRONIN, supra note 113, at 60-62, 87-89; KOBACH, supra note 13, at 244-45.
157. It should be noted that the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments were not the only
constitutional amendments enacted in a legally anomalous fashion. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments were also advanced in ways that did not conform with the spirit of Article V. Ratification of
the former was achieved through outright coercion: amnesty for Southerners participating in the rebellion
was conditioned upon support for the Thirteenth Amendment. See Bruce Ackerman, We the People:
Transformations 113-25 (1969) (unpublished manuscript on file with Bruce Ackerman, Yale Law School).
Ratification of the latter also occurred under duress: martial law was not rescinded and the Southern
congressional delegations were not seated until the conventions in the Southern states voted in favor of the
amendment. See id. at 254-65. The procedural irregularities of the Civil War amendments differed greatly,
however, from those of the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments and the campaign for term limits. A
peculiar set of circumstances engendered this naked coercion of recalcitrant states; consequently, this course
is unlikely to be followed again. In contrast, the proponents of the Seventeenth and Nineteenth amendments
produced a more enduring procedural innovation that reflected fundamental changes in American society.
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Article V may be retained even if the structure of the amending process is
acknowledged to be very different today. In other words, a fair reading of
Article V can accommodate direct and decisive popular involvement.
This view is particularly compelling when it is recognized that the decision
of the Supreme Court in Hawke v. Smith,158 the leading case in the area,
relied in part upon a flawed understanding of the history of the Seventeenth
Amendment. In attempting to construct a strong dichotomy between the action
of a legislature and the action of citizens voting in a referendum, Justice Day
drew an analogy to the popular election of Senators, which he understood to
be "entirely distinct from legislative action" to select Senators.' 59 Day
demonstrated his unfamiliarity with the then-recent history of the Seventeenth
Amendment when he wrote: "It was never suggested, so far as we are aware,
that the purpose of making the office of Senator elective by the people could
be accomplished by a referendum vote. The necessity of the amendment to
accomplish the purpose of popular election is shown in the adoption of the
amendment."' 60 This assessment was, of course, gravely mistaken. The
Oregon system and similar schemes adopted prior to the passage of the
Seventeenth Amendment demonstrated that making the office of Senator
elective by the people could be effectively accomplished by a referendum
vote.16' Thus, the example cited by Day actually undermines rather than
supports his claim that normal legislative action may be clearly distinguished
from legislative action in response to a referendum. The question whether a
legislature acting under the direction of a binding referendum is a "legislature"
in the Article V sense does not have an obvious answer. Nevertheless, Justice
Day's reading seems to strain the text of Article V in order to satisfy the
structural expectations of the Framers.
In Kimble v. Swackhamer, 62 Justice Rehnquist attempted to clarify the
murky distinction between a legislature acting as a legislature and a legislature
acting to adopt the results of a popular referendum. Justice Rehnquist refused
to enjoin Nevada's advisory referendum concerning the Equal Rights
Amendment because the referendum would not bind the legislature to follow
the will of the voters in deciding whether or not to ratify. 63 However, this
ruling only muddied matters further by relying upon another questionable
distinction-that between a binding referendum and an advisory referendum.
In practice, there is little difference between the two. Governments almost
158. 253 U.S. 221 (1920) (holding that state ratification of federal constitutional amendments may not
be made subject to popular approval in a referendum).
159. Id. at 228.
160. Id.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33.
162. 439 U.S. 1385 (1978) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice) (refusing to enjoin a Nevada advisory
referendum on ratification of the federal Equal Rights Amendment).
163. Id. at 1387-88.
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never defy the popular verdicts expressed in advisory referendums.164 Indeed,
the success of the Oregon system in the early years of the twentieth century
illustrates how the formally expressed will of a voting electorate can bind
legislators even if there are no legal constraints on their decisionmaking.
The Court should in the future reconsider the position taken in Hawke and
relied upon in Swackhamer. A perfectly plausible interpretation of the text of
Article V is that the states may impose whatever deliberative or procedural
constraints they wish upon their own decisions to ratify or not to ratify. Only
if such a constraint contradicts the express requirements of Article V can it be
regarded as unconstitutional.'65 Accordingly, the decision of a state
legislature to ratify only if the voters endorse ratification in a statewide
referendum is not in conflict with Article V's requirement that amendments be
ratified by state "legislatures."'' 66 The use of legislative power to affirm the
result of a popular referendum does not transform that power into something
else; rather, it represents a legal commitment to channel legislative power
toward the ends identified by voters in formal referendum proceedings. 67
It is particularly important that the Court recognize just how decisive direct
democracy was for both the proposal and the ratification of the Seventeenth
and Nineteenth Amendments. The impact of the referendum outcomes was felt
not only during the stages of incremental amendment and during the stage of
congressional "proposal," but also during the final stage of formal ratification
in accordance with Article V. When the legislatures in states which had
already adopted the reforms prior to congressional "proposition" swiftly ratified
164. In their comparative study of referendums around the world, David Butler and Austin Ranney
point out that such instances of referendum results being ignored are few and far between. See
REFERENDUMS, supra note 13, at 17, 227-46.
165. This theory of Article V is laid out in detail in Paulsen, supra note 10, at 731-32.
166. A federal district court upheld a similar self-imposed procedural constraint in Dyer v. Blair, 390
F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. II1. 1975) (three-judge court). The Illinois Constitution required that proposed
amendments to the U.S. Constitution win a three-fifths supermajority in both houses of the state legislature
for ratification. The proposed Equal Rights Amendment received only a simple majority in favor. The
plaintiffs challenged the Illinois requirement as a violation of Article V. The court, which granted summary
judgment for the defendants, reasoned that the three-fifths requirement was a permissible constraint imposed
by the state's own legislative rules. Id at 1306, 1309.
167. A possible objection to this argument is the following: if the advisory referendums apparently
allowed by Swackhamer have the same practical effect as binding referendums, then the Court has already
inadvertently opened the door to decisive popular participation in the amendment process. There are,
however, two reasons why the distinctions of Hawke and Swackhamer should be abandoned and decisive
popular involvement in the amendment process openly embraced. First, the prohibition of binding
referendums remains. This entails a risk that future courts may reject "advisory" referendums if they are
too "binding" in nature. Second, the two rulings send unclear signals to state legislatures regarding the
types of referendums that are permissible. Considerable confusion has already resulted in Idaho. In 1975,
the Idaho legislature adopted a statute requiring itself to defer any action to ratify an amendment until after
an "advisory" referendum at a regularly scheduled general election. IDAHO CODE § 34-2217 (1975). In
1986, the Idaho attorney general issued an opinion concluding that the referendum statute was in violation
of Article V in light of Swackhamer. 1986 Op. Att'y Gen. 51,54 (1986). However, the Idaho legislature
disagreed and deferred its vote on the congressional pay amendment until after a referendum in November
1988. Bernstein, supra note 109, at 539. The constitutional status of the Idaho referendum scheme remains
in question. Unequivocal acceptance by the Supreme Court of all state referendums on ratification issues,
binding on the legislatures' decisions or not, would end such needless confusion.
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the amendments, they were effectively constrained by the referendum results.
Voting against ratification was untenable, for it meant defying the explicit will
of the people as expressed only a few years earlier. In a very real sense, the
Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments were adopted by referendum.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Hawke narrowly construed a "legislature"
to be a deliberative body unfettered by direct popular constraints on its
decisions. In the wake of the Progressive era's embrace of direct democracy
and in the knowledge of how the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments
actually came about, this construction seems particularly hollow.
The judiciary should also recognize that the alternative amendment path
has served to preserve what little federalism remains in the process of
constitutional transformation. A vast amount of constitutional change has been
driven by shifts in judicial interpretation produced by changes in the
composition of the Court. In the twentieth century, and particularly since the
constitutional transformations embodied in the New Deal, this sort of
constitutional politics has taken place exclusively at the national level.
168
Such informal "amendment" of the Constitution has occurred without any
meaningful opportunity for the states to reject or support the proposed changes.
This minimization of the states' role in constitutional transformation strikes at
the very heart of the federal framework of government. In contrast, the
alternative path of incremental amendment is initiated and led by the states.
Proposal effectively becomes a state function, and ratification is shared
between the states and Congress. Consequently, this alternative path has




Consider again the current debate over the constitutional validity of
state-imposed congressional term limits. There are plausible textual arguments
on both sides of the issue; deciding the constitutionality of state-imposed term
limits will not be an easy or straightforward decision for the judiciary. But the
constitutional arguments thus far have focused almost exclusively on the
substantive provisions of the Constitution relating to congressional elections
168. Ackerman describes this trend while setting forth his theory of structural amendment. See
ACKERMAN, supra note 134, at 288.
169. There is a drawback to the state-led aspect of this amendment mechanism: while the mechanism
offers considerable power to the states, it does not distribute this power evenly. Citizens in states that allow
popular initiatives possess significant advantages over citizens in other states. Furthermore, when the
transformation has been enacted in some states and not in others, U.S. citizens from different states may
possess different political rights vis-a-vis the federal government. However, these inequalities are
self-imposed. The states without the initiative device can adopt it if they chose, and the states that lag
behind in the incremental amendment process can still enact the reform. This latter inequality is also
tolerable because it is designed to be temporary; the ultimate goal of the incremental amendment process
is a federal constitutional amendment.
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and the scope of federal and state powers.' There is, however, a much
larger, procedural matter at stake. Because the convention path of Article V
has proven impassable, all amendments following a traditional Article V route
must pass through Congress, which has thereby been empowered to block any
amendments that threaten its inherent, structural interests. It is therefore
imperative that the alternative path of incremental amendment be kept open to
protect the viability of Article V in the face of congressional intransigence.
Keeping it open entails maintaining the necessary overlap of state and federal
authority. Consequently, the Court should presumptively favor the states'
assertion of the power of incremental amendment. If other constitutional
considerations are roughly equal, the Court should rule in favor of
state-imposed term limits in order to protect this important alternative route of
constitutional transformation. It has been used twice in the past to usher in
important changes in the structure of the federal government, changes that
Congress otherwise could have obstructed. No doubt there will be future
movements, unforeseen at this point, that require an alternative amendment
path enabling them to overcome the vested institutional interests of Congress.
The continued availability of this path is absolutely essential to the
effectiveness of Article V as a mechanism for constitutional transformation. If
the integrity of Article V is to be preserved, the structural self-interest of
Congress must not be allowed to defeat constitutional change. George Mason
was correct;' 7' historically, Congress has been reluctant to endorse
constitutional reforms targeted at itself. In this respect, the amendment
mechanism crafted by the Framers has proven to be flawed. Fortunately, the
incremental amendment process can serve to correct the problem. If the term
limits movement eventually succeeds in formally amending the U.S.
Constitution, that success will demonstrate the continued availability of the
Progressive era's alternative path of constitutional transformation. It will also
confirm an important pattern. All three amendments involved the congressional
representation of citizens, and all three were stubbornly opposed by one or
both houses of Congress, mainly because the changes threatened to make
reelection more difficult or impossible. The Framers never intended that
Congress possess the ability to block amendments that threaten its own
members. Article V stipulated only two aspects of the Constitution that were
to be entrenched, not three. Fortunately, the emergence of the alternative
amendment path has denied Congress the power to veto changes in the
congressional institution itself. Such constraints are crucial in a system of
limited government. For this reason, a legal anomaly has become a
constitutional necessity.
170. See supra notes 18-19.
171. See supra notes 137-46 and accompanying text.
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